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The division of gender roles in the household and societal level gender 
(in)equality have been situated as one of the most powerful factors 
underlying fertility behaviour. Despite continued theoretical attention to 
this issue by demographers, empirical research integrating gender roles 
and equity in relation to fertility remains surprisingly sparse. This paper 
first provides a brief review of previous research that has examined 
gender roles and fertility followed by a comparison of six prominent 
gender equality indices: Gender-related Development Index (GDI), 
Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM), Gender Gap Index (GGI), 
Gender Equality Index (GEI), the European Union Gender Equality 
Index (EU-GEI) and the Social Institutions and Gender Index (SIGI). The 
paper then tests how five of these indices impact fertility intentions and 
behaviour using a series of multilevel (random-coefficient) logistic 
regression models, applying the European Social Survey (2004/5). The 
GDI, with its emphasis on human development, adjusted for gender, has 
the strongest and significant effect on fertility intentions. The EU-GEI, 
which focuses on the universal caregiver model, uncovers that more 
equity significantly lowers fertility intentions, but only for women. The 
remaining indicators show no significant impact.  The paper concludes 
with a reflection and suggestions for future research.  
 
Key Words: Fertility, gender roles, gender inequality, household division 
of labour, measurement 
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 Résumé 
 
La division entre les rôles des sexes dans les ménages et l’(in)égalité au 
niveau social a été identifiée comme étant un des facteurs les plus 
importants qui sous-tendent les comportements de fécondité. Malgré 
l'attention théorique accordée à cette question par les démographes, une 
recherche empirique intégrant les rôles des sexes et l'équité en matière 
de fécondité reste étonnement rare. L’article présente d’abord un bref 
aperçu des recherches antérieures qui ont examiné les rôles des sexes et 
la fécondité, puis, offre une comparaison de six indicateurs reconnus de 
l’égalité des sexes:    l’indicateur sexospécifique du développement 
humain (SDH), l’indicateur de la participation des femmes (IPF), 
l’indicateur de disparité entre les sexes (IDS),  l’indicateur de la 
participation des femmes de l’Union européenne (IPF-UE) et 
l’indicateur de l’inégalité homme-femme dans les institutions sociales 
(IIIS). Enfin, l’article teste la manière dont cinq de ces indices impactent 
les intentions et les comportements de fécondité en utilisant des modèles 
de régression logistique multiniveau (coefficient aléatoire) et en 
appliquant les données du European Social Survey (2004/2005). Le 
SDH, avec son emphase sur le développement humain, ajusté par sexe, 
représente l'impact le plus fort et le plus important sur les intentions de 
fécondité. L’IPF-EU, qui se concentre sur le modèle universel du 
fournisseur de soins, démontre que plus il y a d’équité plus cela entraîne 
une sérieuse baisse des intentions de fécondité, mais seulement chez les 
femmes. Les autres indicateurs ne démontrent aucun impact important. 
L’article conclut avec une réflexion et des suggestions pour la recherche 
future.  
 
Mots-clés : Fécondité, rôles des sexes, inégalité des sexes, division du 







Gender systems may be one of the most crucial aspects underlying 
fertility patterns (McDonald 2000a), yet despite continued warnings of 
this omission (e.g., Watkins 1993; Presser 1997), empirical applications 
remain surprisingly sparse. As Harriet Presser (1997: 295) argued over a 
decade ago: “gender issues have become central in the policy arena while 
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 Conference on Population and Development pushed gender into the 
centre of demographic discussions, but empirical research on this topic 
has gained considerably less momentum.  
When gender is included in explanations of fertility in 
industrialized societies, it is often exclusively in relation to the changing 
educational and employment position of women. Women’s increased 
participation in education and the labour force and the availability of 
reliable forms of contraception has been central in understanding 
decreases in fertility (Rindfuss et al. 1996; van de Kaa 1987), yet it 
provides only a partial explanation. As also described in broader 
frameworks, such as the second demographic transition (Lesthaeghe and 
van de Kaa 1986; van de Kaa 1987), there are additional factors that 
impact fertility including health, the broader economic context and 
opportunities for women, household division of labour, and 
empowerment within a society to make individual choices.  
The more narrow focus of the majority of literature, which has 
focused on gains in women’s education and labour force participation in 
relation to fertility, means that research has suffered from four serious 
shortcomings. First, there are institutions beyond education and the 
labour market that remain highly powerful yet continue to evade 
equalization, such as the household division of labour, tax systems and 
societal and political empowerment. Second, the focus almost 
exclusively on women in fertility research has resulted in the grave 
omission of considering men and couple fertility decisions (Puur et al. 
2008). Third, although women across many Western countries now 
achieve high levels of educational and labour market participation, 
women’s role and the division of household labour within the family has 
remained relatively constant (Hook 2010). This ‘stalled revolution’ 
(Hochschild 1989) in the household appears to be a crucial factor 
inhibiting fertility.  Finally, the importance of gender roles, equity and 
systems has often been argued in purely theoretical terms, based on the 
pioneering work of researchers such as Folbre (1983), Oppenheimer 
(1994) and Mason (1997) and extended in the work of McDonald 
(2000a; 2000b; 2006). Although gender roles has been operationalized 
and examined (Olah 2003; Miller, Torr and Short 2004; Mills et al. 
2010), societal gender equity has less often been evaluated empirically in 
relation to fertility. This paper provides a unique contribution to the 
literature by engaging in an exploratory empirical analysis to test which 
measures of societal gender equity impact fertility decisions and 
behaviour.  
After providing a brief definition of gender systems, the paper 
turns to a review of previous fertility studies that have integrated these 
aspects. This is then followed by a description of the six most prominent 
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 and international gender (in)equality indices. To empirically test whether 
gender equity has an impact on fertility an exploratory analysis is carried 
out within 24 European countries, which compares the impact of each of 
these indices on fertility intentions and behaviour. The paper concludes 
with a critical reflection about the use of macro-level gender (in)equality 




Defining Gender Systems: 
Gender Roles and Gender Equity 
 
The core definition of gender systems within demography largely stems 
from Mason’s (1997) concept of the gender system. As Mason (1997: 
158) describes: “gender systems prescribe a division of labour and 
responsibilities between women and men and grant different rights and 
obligations to them” The gender system is twofold consisting first of 
gender roles, which are the socially constructed roles and expectations 
for men and women, often related to the division of household labour. 
The second aspect of gender systems is gender equity, which is the level 
of institutionalized inequality between men and women at the macro- or 
societal level, often related to macro-level indicators of national gender 
equity levels.  
  
 
Household Gender Equity Theoretical Background 
 
Fertility research is certainly not immune to the theoretical discussion 
and empirical exploration of the impact of gender roles and household 
gender equity. Perhaps one of the most predominant theories used in 
fertility and demographic research is the economic argument of Becker 
(1981). Women’s increased economic independence (education, labour 
force) is said to increase the relative opportunity costs of childbearing via 
foregone earnings during childbearing and care periods, thereby lowering 
fertility. The opportunity cost of women, in addition to their bargaining 
power, has therefore been posited as an important determinant of fertility 
(Becker 1981; Sen 1999).  
Underlying this argument is the centrality of unequal gender roles 
in the household and the predominance of the ‘male-breadwinner/female 
caregiver model’, where the male partner engages in paid work while the 
female partner remains at home taking care of the children. In a gender 
equal household, the income and paid labour, household maintenance and 
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 Over two decades ago, Folbre (1983: 267) argued that ignoring 
household power relations was a “fatal error of omission” in fertility 
theory. Recent policy directives also appear to overlook this aspect. Even 
at the height of the lowest-low fertility discussion in Europe (Kohler, 
Billari and Ortega 2002), the European Union (2004) introduced a 
mandate to increase women’s paid labour market participation and failed 
to fully recognize that women in many countries continue to engage in a 
substantial ‘second shift’ (Hochschild 1989). This reflects McDonald’s 
(2000a) main premise that very low fertility is the result of a hiatus of 
sustained gender inequity in family-oriented social institutions.  
It appears that the unequal division of household labour is 
relatively persistent in many countries, with men consistently doing less 
and women involved in particular types of household activities (Hook 
2010). Examining time-use surveys from 1965–2003, Hook (2010) 
demonstrated that although there was a decrease in gender specialization 
since the 1960s in selected countries, it was more attributed to the 
institutional context (e.g., public child care, parental leave) and changes 
in the nature of housework. Although there was less time spent in 
cooking, however, this was likely attributed to lower standards and use of 
services or prepared substitutes than the take-up of these activities by 
men (van der Lippe, Tijdens and de Ruijter 2004). Hook (2010) also 
found that a higher prevalence of part-time work of women and long 
parental leaves increased the sex specialization in household labour.  
Oppenheimer (1994) argued that more equal or overlapping 
gender-roles might in fact, strengthen family relationships, whereas role-
specialization is risky and makes the family vulnerable whenever the 
abilities of one or both partners to provide their particular contribution 
(earnings or care) diminish. Or as Hook (2010: 1480) maintains, 
inequality in household labour is: “at the heart of gender inequality in 
modern welfare states.”  
 
 
Previous Empirical Research 
 
Over the past years, several empirical studies have shown that the 
unequal distribution of household labour can impact fertility. In the 
United States, Miller Torr and Short (2004) also examined the impact of 
the division of housework on fertility and found a u-shape effect. Both 
modern couples (i.e., women doing less than 54 percent of the 
housework) and traditional couples (i.e., women doing more than 80 
percent of housework) were more likely to progress to a second birth. 
Finally, using data from a survey conducted in five urban areas in Italy, 
Mencarini and Tanturri (2004) found a higher likelihood of having a 
________________________________________________________________________________________ ______
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 second child among working women if the father increased his 
involvement in housework after a first birth, and if the mother did not 
reduce her working hours after the first child. 
Tazi-Preve (2004) demonstrated that the unequal distribution of 
household labour lowered fertility intentions in Austria. This concurs 
with the work of Olah (2003) in a comparison of Sweden and Hungary, 
who found that a more equal gender division in household tasks 
accelerates the transition to the second child, noting that specific policies 
in Sweden supported this transition. Using European Community 
Household Survey data for Italy and Spain, Cooke (2003 2004) also 
concludes that a substantial involvement of fathers in care activities with 
the first child facilitates the transition to the second child among young 
couples. Finally, in a comparative study of the Netherlands and Italy, 
Mills et al. (2008) determined that an unequal division of household 
labour significantly impacts women’s fertility intentions when they 
already bear a heavy load (more work hours, children), which was 
particularly salient for working women in Italy. 
It is not only the larger share of household labour that impacts 
fertility, but the interrelated issue of conflicting roles between paid 
employment and parenthood that result in higher strains on women, 
which may in turn limit their fertility (Brewster and Rindfuss 2000; 
Becker and Moen 1999). The experience of parenthood often implies a 
crystallization of gender roles, with an increase of women’s time spent in 
housework and childcare, as well as a decrease in leisure time. This dual 
burden or second shift is what tends to cause the most strain on women. 
The reconciliation of roles within and outside the family is more difficult 
for a working mother than for a father. Men typically increase the time 
devoted to paid work and women decrease their working time or even 
exit the labour market (Anxo et al. 2007; Mencarini and Tanturri 2004). 
This is, however, highly dependent on the national context and working-
time regimes (Hook 2010). We return to additional national-level 
operationalization of these contextual factors in the next section, when 




Gender Stratification: Institutionalized Gender Equity 
 
McDonald (2000b) and others (Chesnais 1996; Esping-Andersen 1996) 
have argued that low levels of fertility in advanced societies are not only 
the result of inequality in the household, but incoherence between the 
levels of gender equity within different social institutions. When women 
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 opportunities of men, but these opportunities are then severely restricted 
by having children, women will react by having less and later children. 
Core institutional factors related to societal level gender equity are: the 
level of educational attainment, economic participation and opportunity, 
health and survival, political empowerment of women and social 
institutions. This section first describes the problems and misconceptions 
about measuring gender equity at a societal level, followed by description 
and reflection on the six most prominent international composite indices.  
As discussed previously, an operationalization and empirical test 
of how societal gender inequality impacts fertility has been rarely – if 
ever – undertaken (for an exception see Mills and Begall 2010). This is 
likely attributed to two underlying reasons. First, as we will describe 
shortly, there are several competing indices often consisting of quite 
different measures or difficult weighting systems, making it difficult for 
researchers to choose the appropriate measure. Second, the 
operationalization and empirical measurement of gender inequality 
suffers from a legacy of confusion and misinterpretation. Perhaps the 
largest misinterpretation in this field of research is the use of the United 
Nation Development Programme’s (UNDP) Gender-related Development 
Index (GDI) and the Gender Empowerment Index (GEM) to measure 
gender inequality. Although they are often touted as key measures of 
gender (in)equality, most experts agree that they are in fact not measures 
of gender inequality at all (Schüler 2006; Klasen 2006; Permanyer 2010). 
As Dijkstra (2006: 275) argues, these indices are misleading to the extent 
that they were a “false start” in the measurement of gender equity. 
Schüler (2006) illustrates how both indices have been abused and 
misinterpreted in both academic and policy research. As described 
shortly, the main problem with both the GDI and the GEM is that they do 
not measure the relative position and status of women in relation to men, 
but rather mix (and some argue overwhelmingly measure) absolute levels 
of income per capita or human development (Dijkstra 2006). We first 
turn to these indicators, since they are the most prominent and oldest 
measures, followed by indices that have been more recently developed. 
The ranking of countries according to gender equality between the 
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 Gender-related Development Index (GDI) 
 
The GDI is an index based on the Human Development Index (HDI) and 
thus predominantly measures the development levels in a country, 
corrected by the existing gender inequalities. As summarized in Table 1, 
it consists of three simple dimensions from the HDI of health, 
educational attainment and educational resources, but split by the sexes. 
It was developed by Anand and Sen (1995) to ‘penalize’ the HDI if 
gender inequality existed in any of the three dimensions. The GDI is 
therefore actually the HDI, but adjusted for gender disparities and can 
therefore not be strictly interpreted separately from the HDI. As Schüler 
(2006: 163) argues, this gap between the HDI and GDI should be 
interpreted as: “the loss of human development due to gender inequality 
and the size of penalty given to gender inequality.” Although it has often 
been applied as such, it is not a gender inequality measure in itself. The 
popularity of the GDI is likely due to its simplicity and wide 157 country 
coverage. In addition to the problematic aspects of interpretation, the 
earned income variable is highly problematic and carries significant 
weight in the index (Jütting et al. 2008).  
 
 
Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM) 
 
The GEM is another prominent index developed by the UNDP, which 
measures a very different component of inequality and focuses on 
whether women have access to certain levels of power. As summarized 
in Table 1, the GEM has four indicators of economic and political 
empowerment, which are grouped into the three dimensions of political 
participation and decision-making, economic participation and decision-
making, and power over economic resources. As Table 1 demonstrates, it 
suffers from the shortcoming of limited and specific measures; lack of 
health and knowledge measures, includes only 93 countries, and is 
therefore more appropriate as a complementary indicator. Or as Dijkstra 
(2006: 276) argues: “The GEM is an odd combination of relative female 
and male empowerment.” 
 
 
Gender Equity Index (GEI) 
 
Another prominent measure is the Gender Equity Index (GEI) (Social 
Watch 2005), which focuses on socio-economic opportunities. In 
contrast to the GDI and thus similar to the GEM, it introduces political 
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 Although it includes more comprehensive indicators of empowerment 
and has a broad coverage of 154 countries, as with the GEM, it has the 
problematic omission of the health dimension. 
 
 
Gender Gap Index (GGI) 
 
The last column of Table 1 shows the Gender Gap Index (GGI), 
developed by the World Economic Forum (Hausmann, Tyson and Zahidi 
2006), which also builds upon and improves previous measures. It is a 
multidimensional indicator that uses 14 single indicators to measure the 
level of economic participation and opportunity, educational attainment, 
health and survival and political empowerment of women. It has a broad 
coverage of 115 countries and is comprehensive in its coverage. Jütting 
et al. (2008) argue that it is more appropriate for developed countries, 
which is apparent in the chosen measures. It relies less heavily on health 
indicators, for instance, which are also more equalized and thus less 
relevant in industrialized nations. In a recent study of gender preferences 
of children and the transition to third birth in Europe, Mills and Begall 
(2010) applied the GGI. They found that in societies where there is lower 




European Union Gender Equality Index (EU-GEI) 
 
Mounting criticisms have resulted in the addition of several innovative 
gender equity indices in the last few years. These measures diverge from 
the existing composite indices and are therefore presented separately in 
Table 2. The European Union Gender Equality Index (EU-GEI), 
developed by Plantenga et al. (2009) is unique in the sense that it is based 
upon the universal caregiver model of Fraser (1997). It consists of four 
dimensions of equal sharing of: paid work, money, decision-making 
power and time. In contrast to the indices discussed to this point, it not 
only includes inequality in employment, wages, occupations and the 
political arena, but also the gender gap in caring time for children and 
leisure time, the latter of which are unique. It does not include health 
dimensions, which as discussed previously, are not as relevant within the 
European context. A shortcoming is that since it is only available for 
countries within the European Union (EU), it is limited to a few countries 
and misses some relevant countries in Europe (e.g., Norway, 
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EU Gender Equality Index        
(EU-GEI)
Focus
Social institutions Universal caregiver model
Summary
Twelve indicators grouped into four dimensions Eight indicators grouped into four 
dimensions
Family Code Equal Sharing of Paid Work
  -  Early marriage   - Gender employment gap
  -  Polygamy   - Gender unemployment gap
  -  Parental authority
  -  Inheritance
Physical Integrity Equal Sharing of Money
  - Female genital mutilation   - Gender pay gap
  - Violence against women   - Gender poverty gap among
  - Missing women        single-headed households
Ownership Rights Equal Sharing of Decision Making Power
  - Access to land   - Gender gap in parliament
  - Access to bank loans   - Gender gap in ISCO1
  - Access to property other than land
Civil Liberties Equal Sharing of Time
  - Restriction to freedom of dress   - Gender gap in caring time for      
       children
  - Freedom of movement   - Gender gap in leisure time
for EU Gender Equality Index 
Source: Summary of Jütting, et al. (2008) for SIGI and Plantenga et al. (2009)  
Table 2
A Summary of Recent Alternative Gender Equity Indicators
Social Indicators Gender Index (SIGI)
________________________________________________________________________________________ ______
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 Social Indicators Gender Index (SIGI) 
 
Perhaps the most divergent and innovative index developed in past years 
is the Development Centre of the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development’s (OECD’s) Social Indicators Gender 
Index (SIGI), which is part of the Gender, Institutions and Development 
Data Base (GID-DB) (Jütting et al. 2008). This answers the plea of 
McDonald (2000a) to develop a measure of gender equity with a 
sufficient longitudinal perspective that would demand a more historical 
study with more detailed and even anthropological knowledge of 
societies. As illustrated in Table 2, this index focuses on social 
institutions and the four dimensions of family code, physical integrity, 
ownership rights and civil liberties. It is the only index to incorporate 
measures based on social norms, traditions and family law, tapping on an 
entirely different dimension of gender equity. The advantage of the SIGI 
is that it has broad coverage of around 120 countries and taps very 
different reasons for underlying gender inequality. The main 
disadvantage is the very specific focus, which as the GEM, makes it 
more of a complementary measure. Due to these measures, it is also more 
relevant to developing countries and contains measures for non-OECD 
countries, making its use limited for industrialized nations.  For this 
reason, it is not included in the empirical application within Europe in 
this paper.  
 
 
Comparing the Country Ranking between Indices 
 
Before engaging in a more detailed analysis, it is interesting to first 
compare the indices in a global manner, to determine how consistently 
countries are ranked. Figure 1 portrays the ranking of a selection of the 
top countries according to four of the indices. It shows that the ranking is 
very similar across the indices for highest-ranking Scandinavian 
countries (Sweden, Norway, Finland, Iceland). Although there is mild 
variation in the ranking differences for most countries, some rankings 
differ considerably. The countries with the greatest deviation include the 
Philippines, Ireland, France, Lithuania, Latvia, Switzerland and 
Germany. The ranking for the Philippines wildly diverges, ranging from 
6 (GGI) to 74 (GDI). The GDI’s high reliance on human development 
and income underlies this difference. In Ireland, the rankings are quite 
similar between the GGI (9), GDI (15) and GEM (19), but differ 
considerably from the GEI (45). France also receives highly contrasting 
scores between the GGI (51), GDI (7) and GEM (18) and the GEI (70). 




















Source:  Created by author from: GEI (Social Watch 2007); GDI and GEM (United Nations 2008); GGI (Hausmann, Tyson and Zahidi 2008);
              figures are for 2007.
Note:  Number of countries ranked:  GEI, 154; GGI, 128; GEM and GDI, 177.
Figure 1.  Comparison of Rankings of Selected Gender Equality Indices 
by Highest Ranked Countries:  2007
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 dimensions shows that it is likely related to low (or high) scores on 
several indicators and to differences in the weighting of the importance 
of different aspects. Ireland and France, for instance, appear to be outliers 
in the sense that they score very low on the pay dimension and political 
power. As touched upon once again in the conclusions, a more thorough 
analysis would require deeper comparisons of the construction of each 
index and separate analyses of the separate indicators, which goes 




Does Gender Inequality impact Fertility? 
 
The more interesting question is whether these measures of gender 
inequality can serve as a predictor of fertility intentions and behaviour. 
Since this is the first empirical comparison of these composite indicators 
on fertility, we enter unexplored theoretical territory. For this reason, this 
analysis remains exploratory and no specific hypotheses about expected 
differences between the indicators are proposed.  
 To measure the impact of gender inequality on fertility, two 
different measures are selected: fertility intentions and fertility behaviour 
in the form of the transition to one or higher order parity. Fertility 
intentions have been demonstrated to differ considerably between men 
and women, likely due to different opportunity costs (e.g., Mills and 
Begall 2010).  We also know, however, that intentions do not always 
translate into behaviour. It is therefore useful to also include a measure of 
behaviour. The focus of whether individuals make the transition from no 
to either one or more children is chosen as a basic indicator of behaviour 
in this first exploratory analysis. The transition to at least one child is a 
highly pivotal transition, which often results in women reducing their 
labour market participation or exiting the labour market in many 
European countries. As touched upon in the final discussion, the analysis 
by parity would be a useful extension, but goes beyond this initial 
exploratory analysis.  
 This analysis applies five of the six indices discussed previously, 
namely the GDI, GEM, GGI, GEI and EU-GEI. Since the focus will be 
on 24 European countries, it is not possible to include the SIGI. We 
should also acknowledge that the GDI is more a measure of human 
development, and not gender inequality, but is included for comparison 
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 Data 
 
The individual-level survey data used in this study come from the second 
wave of the European Social Survey (ESS), which is a large-scale 
quantitative survey administered in 2004/5 across Europe. The 24 
countries that are included in the analysis are shown in the Appendix in 
Table A1. Several countries are not included that were in the original 
ESS (Turkey, Ukraine) due to large fertility behaviour differences or lack 
of comparable variables. As Table A1 shows, several of the indices also 
miss indicators for some of the countries, which are then not included in 
the analysis for that particular index. In each country of the ESS, a 
representative random probability sample was drawn with strict quality 
controls employed to ensure that all national samples met the 
requirements. The 2004/5 wave of the ESS contained a module on 
family, work, and well-being comprising of information on family life 
and fertility intentions, making this questionnaire particularly suitable. 
The total sample consisted of 49,066 respondents, which was reduced to 
examine fertility intentions for those of reproductive age and living with 
a partner, discussed in detail shortly. The descriptive statistics are not 





The two dependent variables in this analysis are fertility intentions for all 
individuals of reproduction age living with a partner and transition to 
having one or more children. The dependent variable of fertility 
intentions was measured by the question of whether the respondent 
intended to have another child within the next three years. The original 
variable contained a five-point scale, but is dichotomised in this analysis 
(Definitely and probability not = 0; Probably yes and definitely yes = 1). 
Models were also run using the full five-point scale as an ordered logit 
model, with no significant differences. The second dependent variable 
measures behaviour by examining the actual transition to having at least 
one child.   
The central explanatory variables are the five different gender 
indices, which are included in separate models for comparison, also 
controlling for relevant factors. As described previously, these are the 
Gender Gap Index (GGI), Gender-related Development Index (GDI), 
Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM), Gender Equality Index (GEI) 
and the European Union Gender Equality Index (EU-GEI). The value of 
each of these gender indices by country and the sources are shown in 
Appendix Table A1.  
________________________________________________________________________________________ ______
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 A series of control variables are also added in addition to the 
macro-level gender inequality measures to make the models as realistic 
as possible. For the fertility intentions model, models are run first both 
sexes, with men as the reference category. The models are then run 
separately for men and women. Age of respondents at the time of the 
interview is included in 5-year dummy variables to account for the non-
linear effect.  
Educational attainment of the respondent is added as a control and 
measured in years of full time education, once again as a centred 
variable. In previous models (not shown here), educational attainment of 
the partner was also examined but due to high levels of correlation 
between individuals’ and partners’ education and a lack of difference in 
the direction of the findings, partners’ education was not included in the 
final models. Educational attainment is considered as a proxy for the 
economic ability and higher resources that would enable an individual to 
have a child. Although income would be a more direct indicator, it could 
not be included as a control due to the large amount of missing values. 
Employment status was also added in initial models (not shown here) but 
due to non-significant results and lack of change in the variables, is not 
shown in the final models. Home ownership is included as an additional 
proxy for economic resources and measures whether the house is owned 
by one of the members of the household.  
 
 
Methods of Analysis 
 
The first analysis estimates fertility intentions using a sub-sample of all 
respondents that resided with their partner at the time of the interview 
(including both married and non-marital cohabiting couples) and were 
18– 40 (women) and 18–45 years of age (men). This sample was chosen 
to ensure that fertility intentions were as realistic as possible. Above the 
age of 40, relatively few respondents reported the desire to have an 
additional child. After accounting for missing values, this leaves a 
subsample of 9,708. The model is then estimated separately for men 
(N=4,939) and women (N=4,769).  
For the analysis of the transition to at least one child, the sub-
sample is considerably larger at 22,147 as the only restriction beyond 
missing values is that it includes all respondents that had children born 
after 1958. It was only possible to include respondents with one or more 
children born after 1958. This restriction was necessary because the year 
of birth was only recorded for children living in the household after this 
time. Year of birth was recorded for all children living in the household, 
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 already are likely to have grown up children not living in the household. 
An additional control of whether individuals had children outside of the 
household was therefore also included in the model. Since the second 
model examines behaviour and not intentions, models are not run 
separately for men and women since there is no theoretical or logical 
expectation that they would have different birth outcomes. One indicates 
that at least one child was born with zero indicating no transition to at 
least one child. 
Due to the nested structure of individuals within countries, a 
multilevel logistic regression model is run for both analyses, which is a 
two-level random coefficient model with respondents (i) nested in the 
country cluster j, which includes a random intercept uj for clusters in the 





Gender Equity and Fertility Intentions 
 
Since the goal of this analysis was to explore the viability of different 
composite gender equality indices on fertility outcomes, the focus of the 
interpretation of results will be solely on the indices with little attention 
paid to the control variables entered into the model.  
There are two key observations that emerge from examining the 
full model of both sexes in Table 3. First, the only composite gender 
index variable that has any significant effect is the Gender-related 
Development Index (GDI). The GDI is not only significant, but operates 
in a highly different manner in relation to fertility intentions than the 
other indicators. There is a strong and significant effect that can be 
interpreted as the higher the level of human development, controlling for 
gender differences, the higher the fertility intentions. The GGI also has a 
strong effect, which is however, only borderline significant. Both the 
GEM and GEI have small effects, which are not significant. The EU-GEI 
is the only index that shows a negative (but again not significant) effect, 
meaning that the higher the level of gender equity, the lower the fertility 
intentions. We will return to further interpretation of these differences in 
the final discussion section.  
Turning to Table 4, which divides the analyses by sex, we see that 
the overall effects of the composite gender indices in Table 3 are often 
driven by women’s fertility intentions. This is the case for the GGI, to a 
certain extent for the GDI (where the effect is stronger for women, but 
still significant for men), and very clearly for the EU-GEI. In the case of 
the EU-GEI, the negative effect of gender equality in the household even  
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 becomes significant for women. As we will discuss in more detail 
shortly, a bold interpretation would be that higher household gender 
equity appears to free women from caregiving and reproduction and thus 
lower their overall fertility intentions.  
 
 
Gender Equity and Transition to at least One Child 
 
Table 5 provides the results for the analysis of the transition to at least 
one child where we will once again only focus on the findings related to 
the composite gender equality indices. In contrast to the analysis of 
fertility intentions, none of the gender indices are significant or appear to 
provide a clear improvement to the fit of the model. Both the GDI and 
GEI, which are borderline significant, demonstrate that higher levels of 
societal gender equality translate into the transition to having at least one 
child in Europe. The GEM and EU-GEI do not provide conclusive 
effects. The GDI is also not significant and even has a negative effect, 
suggesting that higher levels of human development, adjusted for gender, 
result in lower levels of the transition to at least one child. In a previous 
analysis examining only the transition to third births (and not at least one 
child as shown here), Mills and Begall (2010) found that the GDI was a 
significant predictor, which suggests that more detailed analyses by 
parity might uncover further distinctions and effects. We now turn to this 





Summary and Interpretation of Results 
 
This paper contributes to existing literature by conducting the first 
exploratory analysis to establish whether the theoretical suppositions 
about the impact of societal gender inequality on fertility empirically 
hold. Although the importance of gender systems, in the form of gender 
roles and societal gender stratification, are often emphasized in 
theoretical terms in existing demographic literature, there have been few 
empirical applications to test these assumptions. A review of previous 
research shows a significant link between unbalanced gender roles in the 
form of unequal division of household labour on fertility intentions and 
behaviour. Relatively no empirical research has been conducted using 
individual-level survey data to connect societal levels of gender 
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  A review of the six prominent gender inequality indices revealed 
that there are multiple choices and considerable confusion about what 
these indices measure. They often measure different aspects of gender 
equality, with some more focussed on human development (GDI) and 
others serving as more complementary measures of certain aspects of 
gender inequality such as empowerment (GEM), social institutions 
(SIGI) or the universal caregiver model (EU-GEI). Even when they 
measure similar aspects, however, they appear to rank certain countries 
quite disparately, which requires a deeper analysis into the different 
components, construction of the indices and the separate effect of 
different dimensions.  
An empirical test of these indices was then undertaken to examine 
the impact of societal gender inequality on fertility intentions and 
behaviour across 24 European countries. A central result was that a 
higher level on the GDI score indicated both significantly higher fertility 
intentions. This striking finding is likely attributed to the fact that the 
GDI is more related to human development and economic prosperity than 
gender equity itself (Jüttting et al. 2008). It also suggests that measures 
more related to economic security may be the driving factors behind 
fertility, also found in previous research (e.g., Mills, Blossfeld and 
Klijzing 2005).  
When the analysis was split by the sexes, an interesting difference 
emerged between men and women when modelling the impact of the EU-
GEI. Recall that the most unique aspect of this indicator, built upon 
Fraser’s (1997) universal caregiver model, was the introduction of equal 
sharing of time in the form of gaps in caring time for children and leisure 
time (Plantenga et al. 2009). There was a negative and significant 
coefficient for women, which suggests that women in more gender equal 
societal contexts operate in a more equal manner to men (also in terms of 
employment, wages, political empowerment), which also frees them 
from reproduction and results in lower fertility intentions. It remains 
important to not over interpret this finding as it measures intentions and 
not actual behaviour, with fertility remaining a couple decision.  
The final analysis examined the transition to at least one child. 
None of the gender indices showed any significant effect, but with the 
GDI and GEI measures bordering on significance with a large effect of 
higher gender equity translating into the transition to at least one child. 
GDI was not significant and even had a negative sign in this model. It 
may be that in the higher equity contexts, which have strong work-family 
policy reconciliation, women are able to combine employment with high 
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 Shortcomings and Future Directions for Research 
 
This paper was an initial exploratory analysis that answered some 
questions, but raised additional issues. The main question remains: Did 
this analysis empirically demonstrate that gender inequality impacts 
fertility? The answer is a nuanced one of yes and no.  
First, it may be that the lack of significant findings for some 
indices (and significant results for others) was due to the focus on 
fertility intentions for all and the more global transition to at least one 
child. Future analyses could focus on fertility intentions not of all 
individuals or transitions to at least one birth, but divide them by parity.  
A second limitation is that the analysis only includes the full 
composite indicator of each gender equity measure. Since each of these 
measures consist of multiple dimensions, it would be useful to examine 
how each of these dimensions impact fertility in a different manner. This 
would allow, for example, for economic or health factors to be separated 
from economic factors and more precision could be paid to determining 
the strength of these different dimensions.  
This exploratory analysis only included 24 European countries, 
which are relatively homogeneous in their levels of gender equity and are 
generally middle to high-income countries. A third extension could 
therefore be to include a much broader variety of countries, also from 
non-OECD and developing nations. It would also be interesting to test 
the SIGI social institutions index (Jütting et al. 2008), which would 
require a focus on non-OECD countries. It may be that gender equity has 
a considerably stronger effect on fertility in developed countries.  
A fourth concern is the need to reflect about what we are 
measuring with these broad macro gender equity measures and whether it 
in fact captures gender inequality in relation to fertility within Europe. 
These macro-level measures remain at the societal level and we know 
that effects are often more nuanced, based on regions, municipalities or 
affiliation to a particular group.  
A fifth and related question is not what we are measuring, but 
actually: What are we not measuring? Gender equity often materializes at 
the national state level inherent in income transfer systems, services, 
educational systems and industrial relations (McDonald 2000b; Esping-
Andersen 1996; Hofmeister, Blossfeld and Mills 2006). With their focus 
on broader internationally comparable indicators, often skewed in the 
direction of developing countries, most of the indicators miss social 
institutional measures relevant for many industrialized nations. Many 
advanced economies, particularly in Europe, maintain income transfer 
arrangements that support the male-breadwinner model. This occurs in 
the form of employment or occupationally-based social insurance, 
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 earnings-based benefits, or joint taxation rules. For example, some joint-
taxation rules can operate as an employment disincentive for one partner 
such as when tax rebates are provided for a dependent spouse 
(Gustavsson and Stafford 1994). Whereas the Nordic countries such as 
Sweden have ‘gender neutral’ tax systems, traditionally male-
breadwinner countries such as Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium 
maintain tax systems that punish a second earner (Esping-Andersen 
1996). Another body of research has shown that fertility tends to be 
higher in countries that have more family-friendly working conditions. 
This includes the provision of childcare, availability of part-time work, 
flexibility of hours, maternity and paternity leave and more open 
conditions for absence (Rindfuss and Brauner-Otto 2008).   
A sixth related criticism is that some of the macro-level measures 
remain almost as a caricature of the national situation. If we take political 
empowerment for example, it remains a question as to whether the 
representation of women in politics is actually a proxy for women’s 
individual empowerment. Germany may have Chancellor Angela Merkel, 
for example, but this is counteracted by a tax system that supports the 
male-breadwinner/female caregiver model and has highly limited 
childcare for children under 3.  
If pressed to give an answer about whether macro-level gender 
equity measures should be used in future research and which gender 
equality index should be applied, the answer would be that it highly 
depends on the choice of the country or countries under study and the 
specific research question. If more detailed analyses were undertaken 
examining differences by parity and exploring variation outside of 
Europe, the existing indices may perform better. The more 
multidimensional GGI seems to capture more nuances in developed 
nations. The EU-GEI may also be useful when examining more work-
family related issues and outcomes beyond fertility. Other research 
questions may demand a focus on women’s empowerment, health or 
social institutions, demanding more focus and appropriate indices in this 
respect.  Although preliminary, this analysis provides a first empirical 
window into how societal gender equity might impact fertility intentions 
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Country GGI GDI GEM GEI EU-GEI
Austria 0.6986 0.934 0.788 0.72 0.52
Belgium 0.7078 0.940 0.850 0.74 0.61
Switzerland 0.6997 0.946 0.660 0.67 –
Czech Republic 0.6712 0.887 0.627 0.69 0.51
Germany 0.7524 0.931 0.831 0.80 0.59
Denmark 0.7462 0.944 0.875 0.79 0.69
Estonia 0.6944 0.944 0.637 0.74 0.55
Spain 0.7319 0.944 0.794 0.77 0.37
Finland 0.7958 0.947 0.887 0.84 0.74
France 0.6520 0.950 0.718 0.64 0.56
United Kingdom 0.7365 0.944 0.783 0.74 0.56
Greece 0.6540 0.922 0.622 0.67 0.26
Hungary 0.6698 0.872 0.569 0.70 0.56
Ireland 0.7335 0.940 0.699 0.69 0.44
Iceland 0.7813 0.962 0.862 0.79 –
Luxembourg 0.6671 0.924 – 0.60 0.53
Netherlands 0.7250 0.951 0.859 0.77 0.65
Norway 0.7994 0.957 0.910 0.83 –
Poland 0.6802 0.867 0.614 0.72 0.53
Portugal 0.6922 0.895 0.692 0.73 0.55
Sweden 0.8133 0.955 0.906 0.89 0.72
Slovenia 0.6745 0.914 0.611 0.72 0.55
Slovakia 0.6757 0.860 0.630 0.70 0.47
Italy 0.6456 0.936 0.693 0.63 0.41
Source:  GGI (Hausmann, Tyson, and Zahidi 2006); GGI (United Nations 2009, Table 28);
 GEM (United Nations 2009, Table 29); GEI (Social Watch 2008); 
 EU-GEI (Plantenga et al. 2009, Table 5). 
Notes:  Period of measures from: GGI (2006); GGI/GEM (2007/8); GEI (2007);
 EU-GEI (data taken from varying years in early 2000s). – means that country is not included.
Appendix Table A1
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